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ABSTRACT
We use anticipated changes in tax rates associated with changes in family composition to estimate
intertemporal labor supply elasticities and elasticities of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax
wage rate.  Changes in the ages of children can affect marginal tax rates through provisions of the
tax code that are tied to child age and dependent status.  We identify behavioral responses to these
tax changes by comparing families who experienced a tax rate change to families who had a similar
change in dependents but no resulting tax rate change.  A primary advantage of our approach is that
these changes can be anticipated, allowing us to estimate substitution effects that are not confounded
by life-cycle income effects.  We estimate an intertemporal elasticity of family labor earnings of 0.75
for  families  earning  between  $35,000  and  $85,000  in  the  Survey  of  Income  and  Program
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Understanding how individuals shift labor supply and income over time in response to wage and
tax rate changes is crucial for numerous economic questions. Estimates of intertemporal labor
supply elasticities and taxable income elasticities have important implications for life cycle labor
supply, aggregate employment ﬂuctuations and business cycles, eﬃciency costs of taxation, and
the design of optimal tax and transfer systems. There remains considerable uncertainty over the
magnitude of these responses. Most estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply ﬁnd
negligible shifting over time (MaCurdy 1981, Altonji 1986, Blundell and MaCurdy 1999).1 More
recent studies, however, have found more sizable elasticities (Mulligan 1998, Kimball and Shapiro
2003). Estimates of the elasticity of taxable income are also variable, ranging from 0.10 to 3
(Gruber and Saez 2002).
We develop and implement an empirical methodology that allows us to identify elasticities using
anticipated tax changes associated with changes in family composition. Parents may claim tax
credits and dependent exemptions for their children that are often explicitly tied to children’s ages.
Changes in the ages of children can thus change parents’ marginal tax rates by shifting individuals
across tax brackets or through phase-in or phase-out provisions of tax credits.2 The aging of
children provides an exogenous source of variation with which to instrument for actual marginal
tax rate changes. We examine changes in family labor supply and income at the time families
experience a child-related tax rate change. Only families with incomes close to “kink” points or in
phase-in or phase-out ranges experience a change in tax rates as a result of these changes in family
composition. We are therefore able to net out changes in tastes that may accompany changes in
1There is an extensive literature estimating static and intertemporal labor supply elasticities. Surveys of this
literature include: Heckman and Killingsworth (1986), Pencavel (1986), Card (1994) and Blundell and MaCurdy
(1999).
2Exploiting child-related tax code provisions to examine behavioral responses to taxation is proposed in Looney
and Singhal (2004). Subsequent studies using variants of this identiﬁcation strategy include Dokko (2005) and
Feldman and Katuscak (2005).
1family composition by comparing our treatment families to similar families who do not experience
a tax rate change.
There are several advantages of our methodology for estimating elasticities. A key feature
of the strategy is that tax rate changes can be anticipated in advance. This implies that these
changes should not precipitate re-evaluations of lifetime income at the time the tax rate change is
experienced, allowing us to estimate substitution elasticities that are uncounfounded by life-cycle
wealth eﬀects. Most studies estimating the elasticity of taxable income have relied on tax policy
changes which are often sudden and may have signiﬁcant eﬀects on lifetime wealth. It is therefore
diﬃcult to credibly distinguish between income and substitution eﬀects, which is problematic given
that the relevant parameter for evaluating the eﬃciency cost of taxation is the substitution elasticity.
The estimation of intertemporal labor supply elasticities has similarly been hindered by a lack of
good instruments for anticipated wage changes. We improve on the existing literature by examining
the response to tax rate changes that are both exogenous and anticipated.
Another advantage is that the tax rate changes we study aﬀect individuals throughout the
income distribution. This allows us to compare families with very similar income and demographic
characteristics. Many previous estimates of the eﬀects of taxes on labor supply rely on comparisons
of diﬀerent income groups. These comparisons can be problematic if incomes of the diﬀerent groups
grow diﬀerentially over time, as during the growth in inequality over the 1980s. We also include
controls for base year income, alleviating problems of mean reversion and changes in the income
distribution.
Finally, evidence suggests that the magnitude of the behavioral response to taxation varies
across income levels. In this paper, we are able to provide new elasticity estimates for families
around the median of the U.S. income distribution. Much of the existing literature has focused
2on estimates for the extremes of the distribution.3 These estimates are relevant for certain policy
questions: elasticities for high income groups may be particularly relevant for calculating revenue
eﬀects of tax changes and elasticities for very low income families have important implications
for the design of welfare programs. Elasticities for our income ranges, however, are critical for
determining the magnitude of aggregate employment ﬂuctuations and for evaluating the eﬃciency
costs of taxation.
We implement our methodology by using panel data from the 1990-1996 SIPP panels and the
NBER tax panel (1987-1990). The SIPP is a nationally representative panel survey of households.
The SIPP data contain detailed demographic and income information on all family members,
allowing us to measure labor supply responses and decompose those estimates into a variety of
margins of response. The tax panel contains precise data on AGI and taxable income and therefore
allows us to estimate a broader measure of the response to tax rate changes.
We focus primarily on tax rate changes arising from the loss of a dependent exemption. Using
the SIPP, we estimate a signiﬁcant elasticity of family labor income of 0.75 for families with base
year earnings between $35,000 and $85,000.4 Our estimates using the tax panel data are almost
identical.
These estimates are at the high end of the range found in previous work. This may be
because studies examining unanticipated changes tend to confound substitution and income eﬀects,
which would result in downward biased estimates. Our high-end estimates are consistent with
elasticities implied by calibrating real business cycle models to data on macro ﬂuctuations and
3An exception is Gruber and Saez (2002) who estimate elasticities across the income distribution using a variety
of tax policy changes. They ﬁnd an overall elasticity of taxable income of 0.4 which is primarily driven by responses
of high income taxpayers. Studies estimating the elasticity of taxable income of the rich include Feldstein (1995) and
Auten and Carroll (1999). Eissa (1995) estimates the elasticity of taxable income for high-income married women.
Studies focusing on labor supply responses of low income families include Eissa and Leibman (1996), Eissa and Hoynes
(1998), Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), and Meyer (2002). Kopczuk (2005) shows that measured elasticities may
depend on the tax base. Giertz (2004) provides a survey of the recent literature on the elasticity of taxable income.
4Throughout the paper, all dollar ﬁgures are adjusted to year 2000 using the CPI-U.
3imply substantial behavioral responses to taxation.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of intertempo-
ral substitution in the life-cycle model and explains the importance of anticipation in separating
substitution and income eﬀects. Section 3 describes the relationship between changes in family
composition and changes in marginal tax rates. Section 4 provides a description of the SIPP
and NBER tax panel data and Section 5 describes the empirical methodology. Section 6 presents
results and tests of the identiﬁcation strategy. Section 7 discusses implications of the results and
concludes.
2 Intertemporal Substitution in the Life-Cycle Model
The traditional life-cycle labor supply model assumes that individuals maximize an intertemporally
separable utility function subject to intertemporal and lifetime budget constraints:
U = ΣT
t=0βtU (cit,l it,a it)( 1 )
Ait+1 =( 1+rt)[Ait + witlit − cit] (2a)
AT ≥ 0( 2 b )
where βt is a discount factor, cit is consumption, lit is labor supply, wit is the net-of-tax wage,
and ait are characteristics or tastes of the individual in period t. Ait represents assets and rt is the
interest rate.5 Deriving the ﬁrst order conditions and solving for lit gives the following Frisch labor
supply function:
lit = lit (wit,λ it,a it)( 3 )
5See MaCurdy (1981) or Card (1994) for further discussion of the life-cycle model. This derivation and notation
follow Card (1994).
4where λit is the Lagrange multiplier and equals the marginal utility of income in period t.N o t e
that in this framework λit captures all information about past and future wages (known at time t)
that is relevant for the labor supply decision. After taking a log-linear approximation, changes in
labor supply over time can be decomposed as follows:
∆ln(lit)=∆αit + γ∆ln(wit) − δ (rit − ρ)+δ [ln(λit) − Et−1 (ln(λit))] + δεit (4a)
∆ln(lit)=∆αit + γ∆ln(wit) − δ (rit − ρ)+δΦit + δεit (4b)
where ∆ln(lit) is the change in log labor supply (or income) between t − 1a n dt. This change
is comprised of a response to changes in the net-of-tax wage (∆ln(wit)), changes in tastes (∆αit),
diﬀerences between the interest rate and the rate of time preference (rit − ρ), and the diﬀerence
between expected and actual log marginal utility of income (Φit). εit is a disturbance term. The
parameter of interest is γ, the intertemporal substitution elasticity.
Wage changes aﬀect labor supply both because they change the wage rate and because they
aﬀect the individual’s lifetime income. A wage change that is unanticipated causes an update to
the marginal utility of income. Estimation strategies that do not properly account for this life-cycle
wealth eﬀect will therefore result in biased estimates of γ. Formally, if cov (∆ln(wit),Φit) 6=0 ,
then
∂∆ln(lit)
∂∆ln(wit) = γ+δ ∂Φit
∂∆ln(wit). If leisure is a normal good, the latter term is negative and estimates
are biased downward.6
Because closed form solutions for λit do not exist, natural approaches to estimating γ are
to use instrumental variables strategies or natural experiments. However, plausible instruments
that provide exogenous but anticipated wage changes are rare. The past literature has used age
and education related variables as instruments for life-cycle wage changes. However, these are
6The life-cycle model also assumes forward looking individuals and perfect capital markets. We discuss the
implications for interpreting our estimates if families are myopic or face credit constraints in the Results section.
5unlikely to be exogenous to changes in tastes and therefore do not satisfy the exclusion restriction.
Furthermore, estimates using such characteristics are often sensitive to the choice of instruments
(Mroz 1987). Mulligan (1998) notes these diﬃculties and examines the labor supply response of
welfare recipients to a fully anticipated change in wages: the termination of welfare beneﬁts when
the recipient’s youngest child turns 18. Mulligan’s estimates imply large elasticities (between
0.38 and 1.66). However, Looney and Singhal (2004) show that these eﬀects can be more readily
explained by mean reversion (mothers on welfarea r eb e i n go b s e r v e da tat i m ew h e ne a r n i n g sa r e
transitorily low) than by intertemporal substitution.
Similar issues arise when estimating the elasticity of taxable income. When tax changes are
unanticipated, as is the case with many tax reforms, they aﬀect families’ lifetime income. Resulting
elasticity estimates are therefore a mix of income and substitution eﬀects. When leisure is a normal
good, mixing income and substitution eﬀects will downward bias elasticity estimates. Separating
the two is diﬃcult. TRA86, studied by Feldstein (1995), was designed to be revenue neutral within
income categories and therefore arguably did not induce wealth eﬀects. However, the reform was
at best revenue neutral at the income class level, not the individual level. Saez (2003) estimates
elasticities using “bracket creep,” an experiment in which income eﬀects are likely to be negligible.
Gruber and Saez (2002) attempt to mitigate income eﬀects by explicitly including a term for the
change in after-tax income in their estimating equation. However, the one year change in after-tax
income is not an ideal measure of the total change in wealth over the life-cycle.
Our estimation strategy exploits wage changes that occur as a result of tax code provisions that
vary based on children’s ages. Because these types of changes can be anticipated in advance, they
should not cause an updating of the marginal utility of income at the time the tax rate change is
experienced. In this case, Φit = 0 and the strategy provides unbiased estimates of γ.
63 Family Composition and Marginal Tax Rates
Changes in the age structure of children may aﬀect marginal tax rates for a number of reasons.
We examine the tax consequences of changes in the number of dependents. Figure 1 illustrates
the diﬀerences in federal marginal tax rates faced by married couples with diﬀering numbers of
dependents. At the lower end of the income distribution, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
phase-in and phase-out ranges have the greatest eﬀect on marginal tax rates. As shown in the
ﬁgure, the EITC schedule varies substantially with the number of dependents.
The ﬁgure also illustrates changes in marginal tax rates that occur as a result of the dependent
exemption. Increases in the number of dependents reduce taxable income (by $2,800 per dependent
in 2000), thereby pushing bracket ”kink” points to higher levels of income. This is apparent in
Figure 1 for families with income between $55,000 and $65,000. These bracket shifts move families
between the 15 percent bracket and the 28 percent bracket.7 When a child no longer qualiﬁes as
a dependent (i.e., is no longer under age 19 or under age 24 and a full-time student), the marginal
tax rate of families in this income range roughly doubles. We focus primarily on this group in the
following analyses and then consider families in the EITC range.
Figure 2 shows the change in the budget set for families losing a dependent in the median
income range. For a given level of income, after tax income shifts down as a result of the loss
of the dependent exemption. For some families, this loss does not aﬀect the marginal tax rate.
For families with initial income in the region immediately below the kink point, the loss of the
dependent exemption shifts them into a higher tax bracket. Given the same level of income, they
now face a higher marginal tax rate. As the ﬁgure shows, there are no dominated kink points in
our experiment; families may rationally chose to locate over the entire budget set.
7Similar changes in the location of the kink point occur at the 28% to 31% bracket for families with income
between $118,000 and $128,000. See Looney and Singhal (2004) for a discussion of other provisions in the tax code
tied to a child’s age and/or post-secondary school attendance.
7Our identiﬁcation strategy compares changes in labor supply of families for whom the loss of
a dependent causes a change in marginal tax rates (the “treatment” group illustrated on Figure
2) to changes of families for whom the loss of a dependent has no marginal tax consequences (the
“control” groups). The loss of a dependent may, of course, have a number of direct eﬀects on
labor supply. However, as long as these direct eﬀects are the same for treatment and control
families, our estimates will not be aﬀected. Under the assumption that treatment and control
groups experience similar changes in tastes and shocks to income between periods, the behavioral
responses are identiﬁed by changes in the tax rate of the treatment group.8
This approach also addresses concerns that diﬀerential income trends between treatment and
control groups can bias estimates of the response to wage and tax changes (Slemrod 1996, Goolsbee
2000a, 2000b). Our treatment and control groups are very similar and we include controls for base
period income. We also test for the possibility of diﬀerential income trends in Section 6.2.
4D a t a
We implement our empirical strategy using data from the 1990-1996 panels of the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP) and the NBER tax panel from 1987-1990.9 By exploiting both
of these data sources, we are able to provide a comprehensive picture of families’ responses to tax
incentives. The SIPP data contains detailed information on all family members, allowing us to
identify husbands’ and wives’ responses and also to determine whether responses are occurring on
participation, hours or other margins. The SIPP also provides a relatively large sample size and
the detailed information on children required to predict their status as dependents. The tax panel
8Although these ﬁgures illustrate only federal marginal tax rates, our empirical analysis uses the TAXSIM calcu-
lators and incorporates state tax rates as well as certain provisions of the child tax credit that can aﬀect marginal
tax rates when a child turns 17.
9The tax panel data are also referred to as the University of Michigan Tax Panel and the Continuous Work History
File. Note that the short panels of the CPS are not suitable for our analysis because of the diﬃculty identifying
dependents once they leave the household and poor matching rates.
8is smaller and contains only the most rudimentary demographic information, but has the advantage
of including income measures taken directly from tax forms without measurement error and allows
us to capture other dimensions of the behavioral response to taxation. In addition, we are able to
test our methodology using two entirely separate data sets.
The SIPP is a nationally representative panel survey of households. Each panel includes
between 20,000 and 45,000 households. Within panels each household is interviewed at four month
intervals for between 28 and 48 months. The 1990-1996 panels cover the time period from 1990
to 1999. We focus our attention on married couples who live with their own dependent children
(children under age 19 or under 24 and full time students) at some point during the panel.10
Our empirical strategy involves looking at year to year changes in income and taxes so we ﬁrst-
diﬀerence the annual observations and use these changes as the unit of observation. We retain only
those families with ﬁrst-period income between $35,000 and $85,000 per year. We drop families
that experience a change in marital status. Table 1 provides summary statistics for this sub-sample
of interest. Column 1 includes all observations. Families averaged $56,430 in earnings (deﬁned as
labor income earned by the mother or father). Women in the sample are, on average, 39 years old
(husbands are about 2 years older), high school graduates, and have 1.8 dependents living in their
household. 11 percent are non-white.
Columns 2 and 3 compare those with no change in the number of dependent children to those
that have one fewer because of a change in the age of their child.11 In general, these families are
very similar. Mothers losing a dependent are seven years older than those with no change, have
slightly lower mean income and schooling, and mechanically have one less child.
We augment these data with the NBER tax panel for the years 1987-1990. The tax panel,
10We limit our sample to married couples because non-married parents often have a choice over which individual
claims a child as a dependent. Such claiming decisions may be endogenous to tax incentives.
11The remaining families included in column 1 are almost entirely families who experienced a gain of one dependent;
families experiencing a gain or loss of more than one dependent represent less than 1% of the sample.
9assembled by the Statistics of Income Division of the IRS, is a longitudinal sample of federal tax
returns sampled randomly on the basis of the last four digits of ﬁlers’ social security numbers.
These data span the time period from 1979 to 1990. However, we use only the 1987-1990 years to
avoid complications associated with the 1981 and 1986 tax reforms and because the tax schedule
during this period more closely resembles the schedule we examine in the SIPP data. These
data provide excellent information on tax-related variables; almost every element of a typical ﬁler’s
return is recorded in the data. However, the only demographic information contained in the data
is marital status (through ﬁling status) and a proxy for children (through number of dependents).
The sample originally contained more than 46,000 returns, but after 1981 the IRS choose to follow
only a fraction of the original sample. Combined with attrition due to factors like marriage and
non-ﬁling, approximately 20,000 returns remain each year between 1987-1990.
Our sample restrictions are similar to those used for the SIPP. We again restrict the sample
to married couples and drop returns ﬁled by dependents or irregular ﬁlers and those who change
ﬁling status.
Table 2, column 1, shows that families in the selected income range have average wage income of
$56,272 (in 2000$), almost identical to the SIPP sample. Average adjusted gross income (AGI) is
$62,601 and taxable income is $29,913. Filers claim an average of 1.3 dependents. Columns 2 and
3 again compare those losing a dependent to those with no change in the number of dependents.
These groups appear quite similar.
5M e t h o d s
The outline of our empirical strategy is as follows: We ﬁrst predict the change in marginal tax rates
faced by families assuming that family income remains constant in real terms between year 1 and
year 2. We then instrument for the actual change in the net-of-tax rate with our predicted change
10in net-of-tax rate. Regressing changes in labor supply and income variables on this instrumented
change in tax price produces estimates of the relevant elasticities.
We estimate the change in marginal tax rates using the NBER TAXSIM program.12 TAXSIM
calculates state and federal tax liabilities and tax rates from survey data using information on
income, marital status, and number and age of children. For each family, we calculate the predicted
tax rate change from year 1 to year 2 as the diﬀerence between the log predicted tax price in year
2 and the actual log tax price in year 1, where the prediction is formed using constant real income
and actual number of dependents. Formally this corresponds to the following:
d ∆ln(1 − τ)it = Taxit−1 (Incomeit−1,dependentsit) − Taxit−1 (Incomeit−1,dependents it−1)( 5 )
where d ∆ln(1 − τ)it is the predicted tax rate change faced by individual i between periods t − 1
(year 1) and t (year 2), and Taxit−1() is the tax schedule faced individual i in period t − 1a sa
function of income and number of dependent children. Note that we use the t − 1 tax schedule in
both years when forming our prediction so that we do not confound changes in tax rates arising
from changes in dependents with those arising from changes in tax policy. When using the SIPP
data, we deﬁne a dependent to be any individual who is eligible to be claimed as a dependent:
individuals under 19 living in the household and individuals under 24 who are full-time students.13
In the publicly available tax panel data, we do not have precise information on the ages of children.
Therefore, we use changes in dependents claimed as reported on the tax return.
Table 3 provides summary statistics for these tax parameters. In the SIPP sample, families
12See Feenberg and Coutts (1993) for a detailed explanation of the TAXSIM calculators.
13To test our assignment of dependents, we merge data from SIPP Tax Modules to ours a m p l e . T h ep r e d i c t e d
number of dependents matches the actual number recorded by the SIPP 92 percent of the time for people with a copy
of their tax form (N=4,844) and 87 percent of the time more generally (N=15,955). Even for children 18 or older, our
predictions match actual reported dependents correctly 74 percent of the time. In addition to measurement error,
part of the mismatch appears to be due to the fact that 4 percent of married couples report ﬁling separately.
11who lose a dependent and those who do not appear very similar in year 1: the year 1 marginal tax
rate and the average taxes paid in year 1 are 31.6 percent and $11,875 for families with no change
and 31.5 percent and $11,845 for families who lose a dependent. These ﬁgures include federal, state
and FICA taxes. The predicted tax parameters for year 2 are diﬀerent in the directions we would
expect. Families without a change in dependents are predicted to face no change in marginal tax
rates and only a $5 increase in tax liability.14 In contrast, families losing a dependent are predicted
to experience an increase in marginal tax rates (to 32.3 percent) and an increase in tax liability
(to $12,456).15 Columns 3 and 4 present these statistics for the tax panel sample. The year 1
marginal tax rates and average taxes paid are comparable across groups and are similar to those
from the SIPP sample. The year 2 predicted marginal tax rate and tax liability are again higher
for families losing a dependent than for families with no change.
As a prelude to the estimation strategy described below, we separate the sample of individuals
who lose a dependent into those predicted to experience a tax change and those for whom no change
is predicted. Table 4A provides statistics for the SIPP and tax panel samples. The net of tax rate
falls for families experiencing a tax change (by 12 percent on average in the SIPP sample and by
11 percent in the tax panel) as parents are bumped into higher tax brackets as a result of losing
exemptions. Those who experienced this decrease in the net of tax rate also experienced a larger
drop in income than those with no change in the tax rate. In the SIPP sample, earnings of families
with a change in tax rate dropped by $2,082 on average between year 1 and year 2 compared to
a decrease of only $79 for families with no change. The same pattern is evident in the tax panel
sample: average earnings of families with a tax rate change dropped $3,275 compared to a drop of
14The small change in tax liability for families with no change in dependents arises from families whose taxes are
aﬀected by the loss of the child tax credit when children age from 16 to 17. This is only relevant in the last two
years of the SIPP sample, and is not relevant in the tax panel sample.
15The increase in marginal tax rates for this group is small on average because most families losing a dependent
do not experience a resulting tax rate change.
12$586 for families with no change.
The average drop in log earnings for families experiencing a change in tax rate is 9 percent
compared to 4 percent for families with no change in the SIPP sample (Table 4B). The implied
elasticity using a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach is therefore 0.42, signiﬁcant at the 10 percent
level.16 In the tax panel, the average drop in log earnings for families experiencing a tax change
is 10 percent, compared to 6 percent for families with no change. The implied elasticity in this
sample is 0.36, very similar to the SIPP estimate.17 Our empirical strategy aims to formalize these
relationships.
We instrument for the actual change in the log tax price with our predicted change and estimate
equations similar to those described in Section 2:
∆ln(lit)=γ∆ln(1 − τit)+βXit + εit (6)
where ∆ln(lit) is the change in log labor supply (or income), ∆ln(1 − τit) is the instrumented
change in the log of the tax price, which measures the change in the net-of-tax wage, and Xit
are covariates intended to control for changes in tastes. γ is the estimate of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution.
6R e s u l t s
6.1 Elasticity of Family Labor Income
We focus on families shifting from the 15 percent bracket to the 28 percent bracket as the result
of losing a dependent exemption. This is likely to be the cleanest experiment since families are
16The implied elasticity is the diﬀerence in the log change in earnings between treatment and control divided by
the diﬀerence in the log change in tax price between treatment and control; in this case, -0.05 divided by -0.12.
17In these diﬀerences calculations (as well as in the following analyses), 7 families in the SIPP and 6 families in the
tax panel are dropped as a result of having no labor income in the second year.
13likely to anticipate the loss of a dependent exemption well in advance. Table 5 presents elasticity
estimates from the SIPP sample. The sample in columns 1-3 consists of families with income
between $35,000 and $85,000 who lost a dependent between years 1 and 2. Column 1 presents the
base IV regression of change in log family earnings on change in log tax price controlling for the log
of family earnings in year 1 and year ﬁxed eﬀects. The elasticity estimate is 0.75 with a standard
error of 0.38. This implies that a one percent change in a family’s net-of-tax wage rate results in
a 0.75 percent change in family labor earnings.
Adding controls for the number of dependents in year 2 (column 2) and mother’s years of
education (column 3) leaves the elasticity estimate virtually unchanged, and the estimates are now
signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The coeﬃcient on log year 1 earnings is negative (around -0.14) as
would be expected if families experience mean reversion in earnings. These results are robust to
adding additional demographic and base-period income controls as would be expected if treatment
and control groups are similar. Controlling for changes in the log of predicted after tax income
does not aﬀect the elasticity estimate.
The results are also robust to perturbations of the income range. Using families above the
kink as the control group (income range $55-85,000) gives an estimate of 0.89 (column 4). Using
families below the kink as the control (income range $35-65,000) gives an estimate of 1.04 (column
5). The point estimate remains stable when the income range is narrowed around the discontinuity
(column 6). The standard error increases in columns 5 and 6 as a result of reductions in sample
size, but the estimates remain signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
There are several reasons why our estimates may in fact be lower bounds on the true behavioral
response. First, some families may not be aware of the potential change in marginal tax rates
arising from changes in dependents. Second, families may not have full control over their incomes.
As Saez (2003) points out, this may cause jumps in marginal tax rates to be partially smoothed out,
14implying that families’ perceived changes in marginal tax rates may be lower than actual changes.
These factors should all create a downward bias in our estimates. Finally, if some families are
myopic and do not predict the change in dependents or if families face credit constraints, they may
be experiencing income eﬀects. In general, this would also cause us to underestimate the true
substitution eﬀect and bias our results towards the uncompensated elasticity of labor supply that
would arise from a static model. However, both treatment and control groups would experience
similar income eﬀects, minimizing this potential source of bias.
Despite the downward biases mentioned above, these elasticities are signiﬁcantly higher than
those estimated in early studies of intertemporal labor supply and lie at the high end of the most
recent estimates of the elasticity of taxable income. If tax changes are anticipated, estimates are
not downward biased by income eﬀects. This bias may be quite substantial. In a survey module
of the Health and Retirement Study, Kimball and Shapiro (2003) ask respondents to predict their
labor supply response to a hypothetical lottery win and use these data to estimate income eﬀects.
In their framework, which assumes that income and substitution eﬀects perfectly oﬀset, these
estimates imply a substitution elasticity of one, consistent with our estimates.18 Anticipation also
means that families have the ability to respond both ex-ante and ex-post, leading to potentially
larger measured responses.19
It should be noted that we are comparing only year-to-year changes and therefore capture only
short-run responses to taxation. There are two major reasons we might in general expect short-run
responses to tax changes to diﬀer from long-run responses. First, families may shift income over
time in response to the change, creating an upward bias in the ”true” response. While this has
18The assumption of cancelling income and substitution eﬀects is motivated by estimates of uncompensated elas-
ticities close to zero (Pencavel 1986). Imbens, Rubin and Sacerdote (2001) ﬁnd smaller but still substantial income
eﬀe c t su s i n gd a t af r o mas u r v e yo factual lottery participants.
19It is also possible that families are especially ﬂexible at the time a child leaves the household or completes school,
making them particularly responsive to tax incentives.
15been raised as a concern in studies of the rich (Slemrod 1995), it is less likely to be a concern
for families in our income ranges as they have little capital income. Second, families may face
commitments that make it diﬃcult to adjust immediately in response to a tax change. In this
case, short-run eﬀects might understate long-run impacts. Again, this is unlikely to be problematic
in our case. Because families can anticipate these tax changes in advance, they have time to make
necessary adjustments. In this sense, our estimates should be capturing what would traditionally
be thought of as the long-run response in a world with commitments. There may, however, be
other reasons why short-run and long-run responses diﬀer. Because the SIPP panels are 2 1/2 to
4 years and we are able to use only 4 years of the tax panel, we are limited in our ability to explore
the dynamics of the eﬀect over a longer time horizon.
6.2 Placebo Tests
A potential concern with these estimates is that families in income ranges close to and away from
the kink may have experienced diﬀerential income trends in the absence of a tax rate change.
This is unlikely to be a problem since our income range is fairly narrow, treatment and control
groups look similar on observables, and we control for base year income. Nevertheless, as a test
of our identiﬁcation strategy we run the following placebo test. We take the sample of families
in our income range who did not experience a change in the number of dependents, predict their
tax changes as if they had experienced a loss in dependents and examine their income changes.
Families with predicted tax changes will be those families close to the kink point, allowing us to test
whether our predicted tax change parameter is capturing other characteristics of these families. We
also estimate the eﬀects using simulated tax schedules in which the tax rate discontinuity is shifted
to alternate levels of income. If our estimates are driven by discontinuous changes in taxes arising
from changes in dependents (rather than diﬀerential income trends or other spurious eﬀects), we
16should ﬁnd no response for these groups.
Tables 6A and 6B shows the summary statistics using simulated dependent changes. In this
sample, families predicted to experience a tax rate change (those near the kink point) have very
similar changes in income to those families predicted to have no change. The diﬀerence between
the groups is small and insigniﬁcant. This placebo test shows that our results do not appear to
be driven by families in income ranges near the kink point having diﬀerent income trends from
families in income ranges away from the kink. Restricting the placebo sample to families whose
oldest child is between 16 and 18 in year 2 gives similar results.20
We then simulate alternative tax schedules and use our methodology to calculate elasticities
under the assumption that the treatment groups faced the simulated schedules (Table 7 ). In
particular, we shift the tax schedule to the left by $5,000 and to the right by $5,000. The resulting
elasticity estimates for these simulated tax schedules are not signiﬁcant.
6.3 Decomposition of the Eﬀects
The tax rate changes we consider aﬀect marginal tax rates at the family level; the elasticity of
family labor income is therefore the measure that best captures the total labor supply response to
the change in the net-of-tax wage rate. In this section, we make use of the detailed labor supply
data in the SIPP to gain a better understanding of the various components that comprise the total
family response. In particular, we examine whether husbands or wives appear to be responding,
and whether the response is on participation, hours, or other margins. We run unconditional
regressions of change in labor income on change in tax price for husbands and wives separately and
similar regressions for changes in participation and hours.
20Running our regression analysis on the sample with simulated dependent changes conﬁrms the results of the
summary statistics table (Table 6C ). However, the predicted tax change instrument is weak in this case, since these
families do not experience actual dependent related tax changes. We therefore consider the summary statistics
evidence more compelling.
17These coeﬃcients should not be interpreted as individual elasticities because the tax rate changes
aﬀect both members of the household. Without making strong assumptions about the interaction
of preferences within the household (for example, assuming that the husband’s labor supply is
ﬁxed), we cannot recover the underlying elasticities for each individual. These estimates provide
information about the composition of the aggregate response but should not be compared to existing
estimates of participation and hours elasticities.
Table 8 presents the results for families in the $35-85K range losing a dependent. We observe
an earnings response for both husbands and wives (columns 2 and 3). The responses along
participation and hours margins are more mixed. Somewhat surprisingly, the aggregate annual
hours response is close to zero (column 4) with the point estimates for wives’ and husbands’ hours
(columns 5 and 6) suggesting oﬀsetting increases for wives and declines for men. However, caution
should be used when interpreting the hours response because reported hours are clustered at 2,080
and 4,160 hours per year (40 hours per week for 52 weeks per year) suggesting that reported hours
may not reﬂect actual hours. In columns 7 and 8 the dependent variable is a dummy variable
indicating the individual has exited the labor force.21 These regressions are intended to examine
the participation response. The point estimates suggest that higher net-of-tax wages are associated
with a higher probability of leaving the labor force (for women) and a lower probability for men,
but the estimates are statistically not signiﬁcant.
Note that there may be variation in the change in labor earnings that is not captured by partic-
ipation and hours or not reﬂected because of reporting errors in measured hours or participation.
Changes in family labor earnings may also reﬂect changes in eﬀort or shifts between wage and
non-wage compensation.
21The sample of individuals not in the labor force is too small to estimate the probability of entering the labor
force.
186.4 Estimates for the EITC Range
We now examine the response to dependent related tax changes for families in other parts of
the income distribution. We focus in particular on families in the phaseout region of the EITC,
restricting the sample to families with base year income between $10,000 and $40,000 (Table 9 ). We
estimate an elasticity of family labor income for families losing a dependent of 0.14 (not signiﬁcant).
The downward bias caused by families not understanding the tax rate implications of a depen-
dent change may be severe for this group, particularly since we measure the ﬁrst year response. As
shown in Figure 1, these families are shifted from one complex tax schedule to another as a result
of dependent changes. It is possible that these families do respond once the change is understood,
but we are not able to examine this with the short panels available in our data. It may also be
the case, however, that the diﬀerence between the EITC and middle-income group responses is a
result of true heterogeneity in elasticities over the income distribution.
Due to sample size constraints, we are unfortunately not able to estimate stable responses for
higher income groups.
6.5 Estimates from the Tax Panel
We now use our methodology to estimate behavioral responses in the IRS-NBER tax panel. This
allows us to test our methodology and compare elasticity estimates using a data set entirely un-
related to the SIPP data. In addition, using tax panel data we can estimate elasticities of AGI
and taxable income. The elasticity of taxable income captures the full behavioral response to the
tax rate change and, as emphasized by Feldstein (1999), is the relevant parameter for evaluating
the eﬃciency costs of taxation. We focus on the $35,000-$85,000 income range because sample
sizes other income ranges are too small to estimate stable elasticities.22 We construct the sample
22Note that this is entirely due to data constraints; our methodology could be used to provide estimates for these
income ranges with richer data.
19as described in Section 3 and assign returns taxable income of $1 if they report no taxable income
and AGI is positive.
Table 10 presents these results. Columns 1-3 present the elasticity estimates of wage income,
AGI and taxable income. The elasticity estimate for wage income is 0.71, almost identical to the
SIPP estimate of 0.75. The point estimates of the elasticities of AGI and taxable income are 0.54
and 3.2 respectively. The estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant, however, which is perhaps
not surprising given the smaller sample sizes in the tax panel. Nevertheless, the point estimates
indicate substantial elasticities that are quite consistent with the SIPP estimates.
We then deﬁne the sample income range by initial taxable income, rather than earnings. The
bracket kink occurs between $40,000 and $50,000 of taxable income, so we restrict the sample to
those families whose base year taxable income is between $20,000 and $70,000.23 We ﬁnd very
similar results for the elasticity of wage income: the point estimate is 0.73 (column 4). The
estimates for AGI and taxable income are 0.04 and 1.07, but the standard errors are very large.
As most of the empirical literature on taxable income elasticities does not distinguish between
life-cycle wealth eﬀects and static income eﬀects, our estimates can be compared to the compensated
elasticities estimated in the tax literature and interpreted similarly.24 For example, Saez (2003)
and Gruber and Saez (2002), interpret their estimates as compensated elasticities. In this context,
our preferred estimates from both the SIPP and Tax Panel (an elasticity of .7) lie at the high end
of the range of recent estimates of the elasticity of taxable income, and therefore imply signiﬁcant
23The location of the bracket kink point technically depends on taxable income. These data are not available in
the SIPP. The standard deduction for married couples ﬁling jointly plus two personal exemptions is about $15,000
in 2000.
24In a strict structural framework, our estimated elasticities are intertemporal (marginal utility of wealth constant)
elasticities. Intuitively, intertemporal elasticities measure responses to movements along a wage proﬁle, holding
the marginal utility of wealth constant, and compensated elasticites measure responses to shifts of the wage proﬁle,
holding lifetime utility constant. MaCurdy (1981) shows that the Hicksian (compensated) labor supply elasticity
is bounded above by the intertemporal elasticity and below by the uncompensated elasticity. Our estimates could
t h e r e f o r eb ec o n s i d e r e dt ob eu p p e rb o unds on the compensated elasticity.
As Saez (2003) mentions, the tax literature generally does not model such intertemporal decisions explicitly.
20behavioral responses to taxation and sizable eﬃciency costs of taxation.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Our empirical strategy employs anticipated changes in marginal tax rates arising from changes in
dependents to estimate the behavioral response to taxation. This strategy has certain advantages
over strategies that examine the response to legislated changes in tax policy. Most importantly,
the tax rate changes we study are fully anticipated and should induce no income eﬀects. Therefore,
we can interpret our estimates to be pure substitution elasticities. One reason why our estimates
fall on the high side of conventional estimates may be because estimates of substitution elasticities
from static models confound life-cycle wealth eﬀects with intertemporal substitution eﬀects.
The intertemporal elasticity of labor supply has important implications for understanding ag-
gregate employment and output ﬂuctuations. If workers respond to changes in wages over time
by reallocating labor across periods, then productivity shocks can generate large cyclical ﬂuctua-
tions (Prescott 1986a). One of the central questions in the debate about these real business cycle
models is whether the magnitude of intertemporal substitution is large enough to explain ﬂuctua-
tions of the size we observe in the United States economy. Our high-end estimates are consistent
with the range of elasticities implied by calibration of real business cycle models to the data on
macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.25
Most of our estimates of taxable income elasticities are unfortunately imprecise as a result of
data limitations. In theory, however, our estimates of labor income elasticities from the SIPP data
should be lower bounds on the true elasticities of taxable income. The high-end estimates then
imply substantial behavioral responses to taxation.
25There are other points of contention between proponents and opponents of real business cycle models. See
Summers (1986), and Mankiw (1989) for discussion.
21Exploiting child-related tax rate changes provides a consistent identiﬁcation strategy for esti-
mating elasticities across the income distribution and over diﬀerent periods of time. There is no
reason to expect a constant elasticity across income groups, and understanding elasticity hetero-
geneity is critical for the design of optimal tax systems. In addition, diﬀusion of asset ownership,
changes in tax law and changes in tax enforcement might all aﬀect the ability of individuals to
respond to tax incentives. As Slemrod (1998) and others have pointed out, it is unclear whether
diﬀering elasticity estimates in the literature are a result of diﬀerences in methodology, diﬀerential
biases across policy experiments, or diﬀerences in behavioral responses at diﬀerent points in time.
We believe that this method has great promise for identifying true heterogeneity in elasticities
across diﬀerent income groups as well potential changes in these elasticities over time.
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25Data Appendix
This paper uses data from the 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1996 panels of the Survey of In-
come and Program Participation. The SIPP is a nationally representative longitudinal sample of
American households and contains monthly observations over a period of 28 to 48 months.
The data is processed as follows. The sample is ﬁrst restricted to married couples for whom
income data is available for both husband and wife. Wage, property income, and employment data
are annualized. Occasionally one or more months of income data is missing; the average values from
non-missing months is imputed for those months but couples observed for fewer than 9 months in a
single year are dropped. (Missing observations arise largely because of marriage or divorce during
the year, the timing of interviews during the calendar, and sample attrition.)
For each couple, we calculate the number of dependent children as the number of own children
living in their household (or away at school) as of December (or the last month the couple is
observed in the sample, if December is missing) of each year who are under age 19 or under age 24
and a full-time student. Couples with no dependent children at any point throughout the panel are
dropped. Observations where the age diﬀerence between mother and children are unusually large
or small (less than 15 years or more than 40 years) are dropped.
In addition, we use data from the continuous work history sample or IRS/NBER tax panel. We
focus on the years from 1987 to 1990 and again retain taxpayers ﬁling as Married Filing Jointly.
Income variables, dependent exemptions, ﬁling status, and deductions are included in the data.
Tax rate variables are calculated using NBER Taxsim. This program takes income and other
variables, including state, year, wages, property income, marital status, number of dependents,
and other variables and produces estimated marginal tax rates. The instrumented marginal tax
rate change between period t and t+1 is calculated by re-estimating marginal tax rates using the
demographic information for period t+1 but the income and other variables as of period t. We
use the period t tax schedule as well to avoid confounding our estimates with responses caused by
changes in policy.
























































No Children 1 Child 2 Children 3 Children
Source: Authors calculations using NBER Taxsim assuming joint filing status, wage income, taking the
standard deduction.




























































Before Tax Income 
28Income range: $35-85K All No change in 1 less dependent
# dependents
Family earnings 56430 56682 55540
(20718) (20717) (21869)
Age of mother 38.8 38.8 45.4
(7.8) (7.5) (6.0)
Age of father 41.0 41.1 47.8
(8.3) (8.0) (6.7)
Non-white (mother) .11 0.11 0.12
(0.31) (0.31) (0.32)
Years of school (mother) 13.1 13.1 12.6
(1.7) (1.7) (1.8)
# Year 2 dependents 1.75 1.79 0.97
(1.06) (1.03) (1.04)
Observations 30367 25848 1947
Notes: Data: 1990-1996 SIPP panels.  Includes married couples with children living in their home with income 
between $35,000 and $85,000. See text for details. Family earnings refers to labor income earned by the mother and 
father. Standard deviations in parentheses. Dollar figures adjusted to 2000$ using the CPI-U.
Table 1
Summary Statistics: SIPP sample
29Income range: $35-85K All No change in 1 less dependent
# dependents
Family earnings 56272 56395 56699
(20097) (19335) (30451)
AGI 62601 62493 67022
(41097) (33257) (102365)
Taxable Income 29913 30056 32231
(22402) (20772) (38591)
# Year 2 dependents 1.30 1.26 1.02
(1.21) (1.20) (1.14)
Observations 11733 10011 740
Notes: Data: Tax Panel 1987-1990. Includes married couples with children living in their home with wage income 
between $35,000 and $85,000.  See text for details.  Standard deviations in parentheses.  Dollar figures adjusted to 
2000$ using the CPI-U.
Table 2
Summary Statistics: Tax Panel
30No change in 1 less No change in 1 less
# dependents dependent # dependents dependent
Marginal tax rate (year 1) 31.6 31.5 31.6 31.7
(7.1) (7.1) (7.3) (7.8)
Predicted MTR (year 2) 31.6 32.3 31.6 32.4
(7.1) (7.3) (7.3) (7.9)
Taxes paid (year 1) 11875 11845 12380 13130
(4676) (4743) (8208) (19259)
Predicted taxes (year 2) 11880 12456 12380 13742
(4675) (4890) (8208) (19275)
Observations 25848 1947 10011 740
Notes: Source: 1990-1996 SIPP Panels and NBER Tax Panel 1987-1990.  Tax parameters calculated using TAXSIM.  




31No change in Change in No change in Change in
tax rate tax rate tax rate tax rate
Panel A: Changes in Marginal Tax Rates
Marginal tax rate (year 1) 31.8 28.4 32.1 28.3
(7.2) (4.5) (7.9) (6.5)
Predicted MTR (year 2) 31.8 36.6 32.1 35.7
(7.2) (6.1) (7.9) (7.6)
Δln(1-τ) (predicted) 0 -0.12 0 -0.11
(0.09) (0.10)
Panel B: Changes in Earnings
Earnings (year 1) 55811 55729 57733 56056
(13999) (9920) (14102) (12927)
Earnings (year 2)  55732 53647 57147 52781
(22374) (15965) (31500) (18643)
Δln(earnings) -0.04 -0.09 -0.06 -0.10
(0.33) (0.43) (0.39) (0.33)
  Difference Δln(earnings)
(Standard Error)
Observations 1768 179 664 76
Notes: Source: 1990-1996 SIPP Panels and NBER Tax Panel 1987-1990.  Tax parameters calculated using TAXSIM.  
Standard deviations in parentheses.  +Denotes statistically significant difference at 10% level.
Table 4






32(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δln(1-τ) 0.748 0.754 0.747 0.891 1.040 1.034
(0.383)+ (0.384)* (0.381)* (0.408)* (0.535)+ (0.549)+
ln(year 1 fam labor inc) -0.142 -0.137 -0.182 -0.317 -0.157 -1.266
(0.050)** (0.049)** (0.052)** (0.133)* (0.066)* (0.627)*
# year 2 dependents 0.022 0.021 0.048 0.020 0.065
(0.009)* (0.009)* (0.015)** (0.012)+ (0.027)*
Years of Education 0.022 0.022 0.024 0.022
(0.005)** (0.008)** (0.006)** (0.014)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 1.489 1.410 1.626 3.120 1.337 13.525
(0.544)** (0.534)** (0.541)** (1.447)* (0.695)+ (6.851)*
Observations 1940 1940 1940 935 1416 411
Notes: Data: 1990-1996 SIPP panels.  The sample consists of married couples who lost a dependent exemption between 
years 1 and 2.  Columns 1-3 include all families with income between $35,000 and $85,000.  The sample in column 4 is 
restricted to those families earning between $55,000 and $85,000. Column 5 is restricted to those earning between 
$35,000 and $65,000. Column 6 is restricted to those earning between $55,000 and $65,000.  Results are robust to 
richer controls for base year income and demographic characteristics.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  + 
significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Table 5
Elasticity Estimates of Family Labor Income (SIPP) (IV)
Treatment Group Alternative Income Ranges
33No change in Change in
tax rate tax rate
Panel A: Changes in Marginal Tax Rates
Marginal tax rate (year 1) 31.8 28.3
(7.2) (4.7)
Predicted MTR (year 2) 31.8 36.4
(7.2) (5.8)
Δln(1-τ) (predicted) 0 -0.12
(0.09)
Panel B: Changes in Earnings
Earnings (year 1) 55914 55255
(13895) (9782)




  Difference Δln(earnings)
(Standard Error)
Observations 21,197 2,289




ln(year 1 fam labor inc) -0.061 -0.093
(0.011)** (0.012)**
# year 2 dependents 0.002
(0.002)
Years of School 0.018
(0.001)**






Notes: Source: 1990-1996 SIPP Panels.  Tax parameters calculated using TAXSIM.  Standard deviations in 
parentheses (Panels A and B); robust standard errors in parentheses (Panel C).  + significant at 10%; * significant at 
5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Table 6






ln(year 1 fam labor inc) -0.064 -0.091
(0.042) (0.040)*
# year 2 dependents 0.013 0.015
(0.008)+ (0.008)+




Notes: Data: 1990-1996 SIPP panels.  Includes all married couples who lost a dependent exemption between 
years 1 and 2 and had income between $35,000 and $85,000.  Columns 1-2 perturb the tax schedule (and the 
kink points) up and down by $5,000.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  + significant at 10%; * significant 
at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Table 7
Tests of the Identification Strategy Using Simulated Tax Schedule
Placebo Groups
35(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable:
Total Wife Husband Total Wife Husband Wife Husband
Δln(1-τ) 0.747 0.360 0.411 0.006 0.179 -0.093 0.251 -0.202
(0.381)* (0.665) (0.464) (0.242) (0.503) (0.313) (0.192) (0.125)
ln(Lag Earnings,Hours) -0.182 -0.280 -0.162 -0.125 -0.295 -0.421
(0.052)** (0.018)** (0.030)** (0.018)** (0.020)** (0.024)**
# year 2 dependents 0.021 -0.007 0.033 0.009 -0.002 0.005 0.006 -0.005
(0.009)* (0.015) (0.012)** (0.006) (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003)
Years of School 0.022 0.033 0.025 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.003 -0.001
(0.005)** (0.008)** (0.006)** (0.003)* (0.006) (0.004)* (0.002) (0.001)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 1.626 2.302 1.279 0.906 2.050 3.074 0.008 0.011
(0.541)** (0.195)** (0.312)** (0.154)** (0.170)** (0.192)** (0.032) (0.019)
Observations 1940 1611 1891 1940 1656 1907 1708 1930
Notes: 1990-1996 SIPP panels.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  The samples in columns (2), (3), (5), (5), and (6) are for those individuals who did not 
change their participation decision.  The sample in columns (7) and (8) are for those individuals who participated in the labor force in the base year.   
Decomposition of the Effects
Table 8











Notes: Data: 1990-1996 SIPP panels.  The sample consists of married couples who lost a 
dependent exemption between years 1 and 2 and had income between $10,000 and $40,000.  
Results are robust to richer controls for base year income and demographic characteristics.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant 
at 1%.
Table 9
Elasticity Estimates For Families in the EITC Phaseout Range (SIPP)
37(1) (2) (3)
Δln(wage inc) Δln(AGI) Δln(taxable inc)
Panel A: Income Range Defined by Wage Income
Δln(1-τ) 0.714 0.541 3.199
(0.698) (0.627) (2.278)
ln(year 1 wage inc) 0.011 -0.193 -0.299
(0.071) (0.038)** (0.054)**
Year dummies yes yes yes
Constant -0.174 2.106 3.017
(0.777) (0.420)** (0.558)**
Observations 734 732 732
Panel B: Income Range Defined by Taxable Income
Δln(1-τ) 0.813 0.044 1.072
(0.573) (0.504) (1.603)
ln(year 1 wage inc) -0.043 0.066 0.073
(0.029) (0.063) (0.176)
Year dummies yes yes yes
Constant 0.407 -0.757 -0.789
(0.319) (0.706) (1.824)
Observations 735 734 734
Table 10
Elasticity Estimates (Tax Panel) (IV)
Notes: Source: NBER Tax Panel 1987-1990.  Tax parameters calculated using TAXSIM.  Robust standard errors 
in parentheses.  Panel A includes families with base year wage income between $35,000 and $85,000; Panel B 
includes families with base year taxable income between $20,000 and $70,000.
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